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The euro-area recovery remains on track 
although the renewed market turbulence seen 
over the past two months shows that uncertainty 
and downside risks remain high. Recoveries 
following financial crises tend to be more 
gradual and more moderate than 'conventional' 
recoveries as they are held back by weak 
domestic demand and tight credit conditions. 
The ongoing recovery will be no exception: 
According to the Commission's spring forecast, 
near-term growth prospects remain rather 
subdued, with the recovery gaining traction only 
towards the end of this year and into next. 
Overall, the euro-area economy is projected to 
grow by just below 1% in 2010 and 1½% in 
2011. The recovery path is set to be bumpy, 
however, with an uneven pace of growth across 
Member States. This reflects differences in the 
scale of the adjustment challenge across 
economies and the policies being pursued.  
Recent hard and soft indicators are in line with 
our spring forecast. At 0.2% quarter-on-quarter, 
GDP growth in the first quarter came in slightly 
stronger than both our expectations and the 
outturn at the end of last year (0.1% q-o-q). 
Driven by a sharp rebound in world trade, 
industrial production has increased by 5% since 
the beginning of the year and is now set on a 
robust growth path. Some sentiment indictors 
eased in May but the overall level of confidence 
remains high and consistent with solid growth.  
Tensions stemming from developments in 
sovereign bond markets have spilled over into 
other parts of the financial markets. Capital 
markets have suffered heavy losses amid intense 
volatility over the last couple of weeks. 
Concerns about the degree of contagion from the 
Greek fiscal crisis and doubts about the strength 
of the economic recovery have intensified. 
To reassure financial markets and stem financial 
market risks at large, a comprehensive policy 
response has been put in place. It caters for 
immediate financial needs but also sets out an 
ambitious reform programme to make sure that 
past policy mistakes are not repeated.  
Beginning of May, the Commission, ECB and 
IMF reached an agreement with the Greek 
authorities on an economic programme 
supported by loans amounting to €110 billion. 
The financial package will include €80 billion in 
bilateral loans provided by euro-area Member 
States together with a €30 billion loan by the 
IMF under a Stand-By Arrangement. Bilateral 
loans by euro-area Members will be pooled and 
coordinated by the Commission.  
A few days later, the Council and the Member 
States agreed on a comprehensive package to 
provide assistance to any Member State in 
serious financial distress. The package includes a 
regulation establishing a European financial 
stabilisation mechanism with a lending capacity 
guaranteed by the EU budget of up to €60 billion 
loans. The governments of the euro-area 
Member States also agreed to establish a 
European financial stability facility. If needed 
they will provide additional assistance for up to 
€440 billion through a special purpose vehicle – 
guaranteed by participating Member States – 
that will expire after 3 years. The activation of 
these loans will, of course, be subject to strong 
conditionality.  
An effective response to the sovereign crisis 
should not only rest on financial assistance 
packages, notwithstanding their importance, but 
also on a credible consolidation strategy. It is 
essential to ensure sound fiscal positions of all 
Member States and return to a path of 
sustainable growth. Our consolidation strategy 
must be based on three principles. First, a 
coordinated but differentiated approach is 
essential: countries with no fiscal space should 
accelerate the pace of consolidation already now 
in 2010 while countries with more fiscal space 
should confirm their projects and start in 2011. 
Some Member States (e.g. Spain, Portugal and 
Greece) have already announced new 
consolidation measures and more ambitious 
fiscal targets for 2010-11. Second, consolidation 
should be growth friendly. Expenditure cuts are 
normally better for growth than tax rises, albeit 
some tax rises may not be avoidable. Third, 
consolidation must be accompanied by 
significant structural reforms to enhance growth, 
competitiveness and fiscal sustainability. As in 
the case of fiscal consolidation, structural 
reforms should be targeted to removing country 
specific growth bottlenecks.  
Beyond the immediate action to deal with the 
sovereign crisis, it is time to draw the lessons 
from the crisis. The crisis has - dramatically 
exposed the weaknesses of the current 
institutional set-up of the EU in general and the 
euro area in particular. We need to step up our 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2010 
 
- 6 -
efforts and improve our governance system in 
order to tackle these weaknesses at their root and 
avoid similar stresses in the future. Reforms to 
the system of coordination and surveillance of 
economic policies are necessary for all EU-27 
Member States, but successful governance 
reforms are of existential importance for the euro 
area.  
To this end, the Commission adopted a 
Communication on 12 May which lays out a 
range of proposals to reinforce economic policy 
coordination in the EU. The proposals are 
framed around three main building blocks. First, 
we need to take steps to ensure a more rigorous 
surveillance of public debt and sustainability, 
and a deeper ex ante coordination of fiscal 
policy, so as to ensure that the EU dimension is 
appropriately reflected when national 
governments decide on their budgets. Second, 
our surveillance framework and policy 
coordination must be broadened beyond fiscal 
issues to macroeconomic imbalances and 
competitiveness developments. To achieve 
stronger policy coordination in the fiscal and 
structural areas, the Communication proposes to 
establish a "European Semester" for economic 
policy coordination, so that Member States 
would benefit from early coordination at 
European level as they prepare their national 
stability and convergence programmes and their 
national reform programmes. Finally, the 
financial assistance measures agreed recently 
must be turned into a permanent and robust 
crisis resolution mechanism for the euro area. 
Most of the proposals pertain to the EU as a 
whole, but a more demanding approach is 
proposed for the euro area. These Commission 
proposals were discussed and endorsed to the 
very large extent by the latest European Council.   
Last quarter, we stressed that the crisis had 
increased awareness of the need for a decisive 
response to ensure proper functioning of the euro 
area. It is good to see that we are indeed seizing 
this opportunity and are moving ahead towards a 
more effective governance system in the euro 
area. 
Turning to the analytical work presented in this 
issue of the Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, 
we focus on the export performance of the euro 
area. The past two years have highlighted the 
role of foreign trade as a transmission channel 
during economic crises and the exposure of the 
euro area to swings in world trade. Short-term 
projections also point to persistent weaknesses in 
domestic demand in the euro area and to a 
recovery that is largely driven by exports. Given 
the central role played by exports in the 
dynamics of the euro-area economy both in the 
recent past and the near future, we discuss how 
the crisis will affect the euro-area's export 
capacity.  
Our assessment is reasonably upbeat. Euro–area 
exporters have performed relatively well in the 
years preceding the crisis and did better than 
generally acknowledged. Despite a substantial 
appreciation of the euro's exchange rate, losses 
in market share were more contained than for the 
US or Japan. This reflects a strong position in 
some fast-growing markets such as Russia and 
new EU Member States, although the presence 
in China still remains somewhat weak. The euro 
area appears insufficiently specialised in 
research-intensive and ICT sectors. But euro-
area exporters performed well in some key 
export sectors that acted as powerful export 
engines. Among those were both fast-growing 
high-tech sectors such as pharmaceuticals, but 
also medium-tech and slower-growing ones such 
as machinery and transport. There is also 
evidence that exporters have responded to 
increased price competition by improving 
product quality. Overall, their competitive 
position appears relatively strong, which augurs 
well for their capacity to exploit the 
opportunities offered by the recovery in world 
trade. This will, however, require tackling a 
number of important medium-term challenges, 
including a shift of the driving force of world 
trade from advanced to emerging economies in 
Asia and Latin America and a potentially lasting 
negative effect of the crisis on demand in some 
important euro-area trade partners.  
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The past two years highlighted the role of foreign 
trade as a transmission channel during economic 
crises. The global economic crisis was associated 
with a sharp slump in world trade which imposed 
a heavy toll on growth in the euro area. This focus 
section reviews the export performance of the 
euro area before and during the crisis with a view 
to assessing the potential challenges faced by 
euro-area exporters in a post crisis world. 
Section I.1 discusses pre-crisis developments in 
euro-area exports and relates them to 
developments in various price and non-price 
competitiveness factors. Section I.2 reviews the 
behaviour of euro-area exports during the crisis 
and Section I.3 draws some lessons on the 
medium-term challenges faced by euro-area 
exporters. Section I.4 concludes. 
I.1. Pre-crisis developments in euro-area 
exports 
A fairly strong pre-crisis performance… 
Total euro-area exports of goods and services (i.e. 
intra and extra) expanded rapidly during the 
decade preceding the crisis, growing in real terms 
at about 5-6% annually. As a result, the share of 
exports in euro-area GDP gained more than 10 pp 
between 1998 and 2007 (Graph I.1). Trade has 
been severely hit by the global economic crisis 
and the ratio of exports to GDP lost 5 pp in 2008-
09. Exports shed more than 17% in volume 
between their peak in 2008Q1 and their trough in 
2009Q2. Signs of recovery have been visible 
since the second half of 2009 but the level of 
exports still remains well below its pre-crisis 
peak.  
As shown in Graph I.1, real exports of goods and 
of services expanded at a broadly comparable 
pace over the period. Nevertheless, services 
managed to sustain somewhat faster price growth 
and the share of services in total nominal exports 
increased significantly and now exceeds 30%. The 
impact of the crisis and the ensuing rebound were 
significantly stronger for goods than for services.  
Graph I.1: Export of goods and services, euro 
area (intra- and extra-EA, in % of GDP at           
constant prices, 1995Q1 to 2009Q4) (1) 
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(1) Based on quarterly national account data. 
Source: Commission services. 
National accounts for the euro area currently still 
lump together intra and extra-euro-area exports. 
Only trade data for goods provide a breakdown 
into intra- and extra euro area destinations. They 
indicate that extra-euro-area exports grew much 
faster, in real terms, than intra-euro-area trade 
during the decade preceding the crisis with a pace 
of expansion nearly twice as high (Graph I.2). The 
growth gap is however much lower in nominal 
terms reflecting much more muted inflation in 
Euro–area exporters have performed relatively well during the period spanning the launch of the euro up to 
the onset of the global economic crisis. Notwithstanding a substantial appreciation of the euro's real effective 
exchange rate, losses in market share were more contained than for the US or Japan. Euro-area exporters 
benefited from a strong position in fast-growing destinations such as Russia and new EU Member States, which 
more than offset a comparatively weaker position on the Chinese market. Judging by traditional indicators of 
comparative advantage, the sectoral structure of the euro-area exports does not appear particularly strong, 
with a higher specialisation in labour intensive goods than the US or Japan and a weaker specialisation in 
research-intensive and ICT sectors. But euro-area exporters performed well in some key export sectors, which 
worked as export engines. Among those were fast-growing, high-tech sectors such as pharmaceuticals, but also 
medium-tech, slower-growing ones such as machinery and transport. There is also evidence that exporters 
have withstood competition by improving product quality. Notwithstanding a relatively good pre-crisis 
performance, euro-area exporters have been strongly affected by the crisis and face a number of medium-term 
challenges. These include the shift of the driving force of world trade from advanced to emerging economies 
and a potentially lasting negative effect of the crisis on demand in some important trade destinations.  
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extra euro-area than intra euro-area export prices. 
In addition to possible exchange rate factors, 
differences in the various export markets' growth 
rates and differences in the product composition 
of the two types of trade, this could also be an 
indication that exporters wield more pricing 
power inside than outside the euro area. 
Graph I.2: Extra and intra euro-area exports 
of goods (volume index 2000=100, 2000Q1 to 
2010Q1) (1) 
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(1) Based on goods trade statistics. 
Source: CPB, Commission services. 
 
Graph I.3: Export market shares, euro area, 
US and Japan (current prices, index 2000=100, 
1999Q1 to 2010Q1) (1) 
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(1) Euro-area exports cover extra euro-area trade only. Based on 
goods trade statistics. 
Source: CPB, Commission services. 
The euro area's performance over the decade 
preceding the crisis compares quite favourably 
with the US and Japan. In volume terms, extra- 
euro-area exports grew significantly faster than in 
the US over that period, although more slowly 
than in Japan. In nominal terms, however, the 
performance of the euro area stands out. Since the 
mid- to late 1990s, most advanced economies 
have experienced a significant erosion in the share 
of their exports in total world trade, reflecting the 
emergence of new major players, most notably 
China.  
Losses in market shares have however been 
considerably more contained for the euro area 
than for the US or Japan (Graph I.3). The 
comparatively strong position of the euro area on 
the basis of nominal trade data is suggestive of a 
product and geographical specialisation that 
affords higher pricing power. 
… that cannot be explained by exchange rate 
developments  
Price and cost competitiveness is one of the key 
determinants of the export performance. New 
estimations of medium-term exchange rate 
elasticicies presented in Box I.1 suggest that a 
10% appreciation of the euro real effective 
exchange rate (REER) leads to 5-6% drop in extra 
euro-area exports of goods in the medium term. 
The 25 to 30% appreciation of the REER 
(depending on concept used) from its 2000 trough 
to its pre-crisis peak has probably curbed annual 
euro-area export growth by more than 1.5 pp. 
 
Table I.1: Changes in real effective exchange 
rates and export market shares (1) 
Euro area US Japan
Change in REER 24.1 -26.8 -17.0
Change in market share (value) -9.6 -28.4 -21.0
Change in market share (volume) -19.3 -3.1 6.4
2002Q1-2008Q2
(1) Changes in REER: in %; changes in market shares in pp. 
Markets shares are measured by the ratio of goods exports to 
total world imports.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
Nevertheless, as shown in Table I.1, differences in 
export performance between the euro area, the US 
and Japan in the years preceding the crisis are 
difficult to explain on the basis of exchange rate 
developments. For instance, between 2002 and 
2008, the euro real effective exchange rate 
experienced a strong appreciation while, both US 
and Japan exporters benefited from large gains in 
price competitiveness. Differences in market 
share developments over that period are difficult 
to relate to these swings in exchange rates.  
This is just another evidence of the importance on 
non-price competitiveness factors in advanced 
economies. Section II.1 in this report provides an 
econometric analysis of the importance of non-
price factors for euro-area exports. The analysis 
focuses mostly on technological factors and 
highlights the importance of innovation and    
product quality.  For instance,  R&D spending and 
I. Export performance of the euro area 
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Box I.1: Euro-area export demand equations
Standard export demand equations regress real exports on foreign income and relative export prices. Based on this 
framework estimates of export price and income elasticities for the euro area are presented below, using quarterly 
data between 1989Q1 and 2009Q3. Exports are defined as extra-euro area exports of final and intermediate goods, 
deflated by export unit value indices. Foreign income is defined as the weighted average of the real GDP of 25 
trading partners (8 before 1995, chain linked), with weights proportional to the inverse distance of the trading 
partners. This choice of weights avoids the possible endogeneity problem inherent to standard export shares used as 
weights in the literature. Finally, relative export prices are measured by the real effective exchange rate (REER). A 
CPI-based REERs is used, computed by DG ECFIN vis-à-vis 25 competitor countries since 1995 (8 before 1995, 
chain linked). The resulting baseline specification is:   
tttt ereeryx +++= lnlnln 2*10 βββ                      (1) 
where t indexes time, xt denotes real exports, yt* denotes foreign income, reert denotes the real effective exchange 
rate and et is the disturbance. Given that the series are non-stationary the estimation was carried out in a 
cointegration framework using a Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) estimator with four leads and lags. 
Next to the baseline regressions, specifications with imported intermediate products as an explanatory variable are 
estimated as well. Arguably, if exported output makes use of imported intermediate products, then the expected 
sensitivity of exports to exchange rate variations is lower because, in case of appreciations, firms benefit from lower 
import prices of intermediates. Including the import of intermediate goods as additional explanatory variable in the 
regression will control for this effect. 
Dependent variable Log of extra-euro-area exports 
 (1) (2) 
Log of foreign income 1.55*** 
(0.063) 
1.27** 
(0.305) 
Log of REER (ECFIN) -0.52*** 
(0.102) 
-0.59*** 
(0.129) 
Log of intermediate imports  0.15 
(0.208) 
No. of observations 76 71 
R² 0.987 0.991 
Newey-West standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
Results show that long-term elasticities to the REER range between 0.4-0.6 in absolute value, while the elasticity of 
exports to changes in foreign income ranges between 1.2-1.6. The REER elasticities are higher when intermediate 
imports are controlled for, in line with the argument for including them. However, the direct effect of intermediate 
imports on exports cannot be estimated precisely as these coefficients are not significant. The corresponding Error 
Correction Models (ECMs) permit to estimate the speed of adjustment of exports to their long-run equilibria. They 
indicate that the half life of exports is approximately 4 quarters. 
Residuals from the ECM of regression (1) Export response to 10% REER depreciation 
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patents are reported to be positively correlated 
with exports of goods. The remainder of the 
present section takes a different (non-
econometric) approach and analyses the structural 
strengths and weaknesses of the euro-area exports 
in terms of its geographical and product market 
specialisation. 
A fairly supportive geographical specialisation  
The geographical specialisation of euro-area trade 
reflects to a considerable degree its trading 
partner's geographical proximity. The euro area 
trades predominantly with the rest of Europe 
which absorbs more than 50% of its exports if 
Russia is included. In contrast, Asia or Latin 
America are destinations of much lesser 
importance than for US or Japanese exporters (see 
Table I.2). The euro area ships a share of its 
exports to the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) that is slightly larger that the US's but 
considerably lower that the Japan's.  The biggest 
part of this is accounted for by Russia with China 
playing a comparatively more modest role 
In pre-crisis years, the euro-area's geographical 
specialisation proved to be conducive to export 
growth. For instance, simple calculations show 
that the geographical structure of euro-area 
exports was somewhat more supportive than that 
of the US or Japan from the beginning of the 
decade to the onset of the crisis.(1) Although the 
euro area is less well positioned than the US or 
Japan in some critical emerging markets like 
China, this has tended to be more than offset by a 
comparatively strong position on fast growing 
European markets, including new EU Member 
States, Russia and other emerging European 
                                                        
(1) Cross-country comparisons of the effect of the geographical 
structure can be assessed by calculating what export growth 
would have been if market shares had remained constant on 
all geographical destinations.  
economies. Obviously, whether a specific 
geographical specialisation is supportive or not is 
period-dependent and, as will be discussed in 
Section I.3, a structure that was supportive in pre-
crisis years may turn out to be unfavourable in 
post-crisis years.  
 
Table I.2: Geographical breakdown of 
exports, euro area, US and Japan (in %) (1) 
Import growth 
Euro area US Japan 2000-07 (1)
US 13.1 - 20.4 1.1
Brazil 1.2 2.1 0.6 5.5
China 4.1 5.6 15.3 16.2
India 1.5 1.5 0.9 15.7
Russia 4.5 0.6 1.5 21.8
Africa 5.8 2.0 1.6 7.7
DAE (2) 4.5 8.7 21.8 4.3
Euro area - 15.7 11.1 5.8
EFTA 7.1 1.8 0.6 4.8
UK, DK, SE 21.2 5.0 2.7 3.6
Latin America (excl. BR) 2.9 17.7 3.8 2.8
Other Asia 9.8 13.3 13.9 4.0
Other Europe 5.8 0.8 0.6 12.7
Non-euro NMS 14.1 0.7 1.0 12.8
other 4.3 24.5 4.3 4.8
Total 100 100 100 5.2
of which:
     OPEC 5.6 4.2 4.5 9.4
     Total BRICs 11.4 9.9 18.2 14.0
Share of total exports in 2007
(1) Average annual growth in EUR. (2) Hong-Kong, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Looking at how the euro area has responded to the 
emergence of new trading partners, the picture is 
somewhat less encouraging. The euro area has, to 
some extent, adjusted to the changing 
geographical structure of world import demand by 
channelling exports to fast growing markets. In 
particular, the shares of the BRICs and of fast 
growing European markets in total euro-area 
exports have increased more or less steadily over 
the 2000-07 period. Nevertheless, much of this 
shift reflects the intrinsic dynamics of these new 
Box (continued) 
 
 The ECM can be used to answer two timely questions as well. The first is whether the drop in export volumes, 
observed in late 2008 and early 2009, can be treated as a usual response of trade to GDP changes. The left-hand 
panel of the graph above, which shows the residuals from the ECM of regression (1), suggests otherwise. The recent 
slump was clearly out of the ordinary, with exports falling much more sharply than what the equation would suggest 
on the basis of the slump in world GDP. Moreover, the graph also shows that the following rebound is quite strong 
in historical comparison. This decoupling between exports and GDP is, however, not a purely euro-area 
phenomenon as indicated by large swings in the ratio of world exports to world GDP over the period. The second 
question is how the recent devaluation of the euro affects exports. The right-hand panel of the graph presents the 
export response to a 10% permanent decrease in the REER based on the same ECM. The long term increase in 
exports is 5.2%, 80% of which is realised in the first year and the remaining part in the second year. The model 
indicates slight overshooting, which is adjusted slowly and is eliminated by the end of the fifth year. 
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markets as the euro area has tended to lose market 
shares vis-à-vis these two broad destinations in 
recent years. The losses partly reflect the 
emergence of new global players but, worryingly, 
they have generally been larger for the euro area 
than for the US or Japan. This points to some 
form of erosion in the euro area's relative 
advantage in terms of geographical specialisation. 
A relatively weak sectoral structure of exports 
in terms of factor intensity and technology… 
The sectoral composition of exports can be 
analysed by looking at sectors aggregated 
according to their factor intensity or technology 
content. (2) This shows that euro-area exports are 
mainly specialised in capital- and research-
intensive goods, especially in those that can be 
further classified as 'difficult to imitate' 
(Table I.3). However, in contrast to the US and 
Japan, the euro area also exhibits a small 
comparative advantage in labour intensive goods. 
Furthermore, its specialisation in research-
intensive goods that are difficult to imitate is less 
strong than in the US or Japan.  
 
Table I.3: Sectoral specialisation of exports 
(1995-2007) (1) 
Average Change Average Change Average Change
Research intensive
  - difficult to imitate 1.16 0.07 1.45 0.20 1.58 -0.02
  - easy to imitate 1.02 0.14 1.08 -0.07 1.08 -0.27
Capital intensive 1.28 0.07 0.87 -0.01 1.75 0.38
Labour intensive 1.05 -0.01 0.75 0.12 0.40 0.04
Raw materials intensive 0.49 -0.10 0.66 -0.25 0.09 0.05
High tech 0.94 0.13 1.50 0.09 0.84 -0.47
   - of which ICT 0.51 -0.01 1.04 -0.40 1.22 -0.82
Medium-high tech 1.18 0.03 1.11 -0.02 1.61 0.08
Medium-low tech 0.90 -0.11 0.75 -0.02 0.91 -0.04
Low tech 0.81 -0.09 0.64 -0.07 0.19 -0.02
Technology content
Euro area USA Japan
Factor intensity
(1) Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage 
Source: Commission services. 
 
When exports are classified according to their 
technology content, the US stands out with a 
strong comparative advantage in high-tech 
products, whereas the euro area and Japan rather 
specialise in medium-technology goods. Both the 
US and Japan have a strong position in ICT 
sectors, which are a subset of high-technology 
goods. In contrast, the euro area is particularly 
disadvantaged in this group of goods.  
                                                        
(2) Compare e.g. Baumann, U., F. di Mauro (2007), 
“Globalisation and euro area trade. Interactions and 
challenges”, ECB Occasional paper series No. 55. 
Overall, the static analysis of the indicators of so-
called revealed comparative advantage does not 
point to a strong competitive position of euro-area 
exports. However, as discussed in the next two 
paragraphs, the dynamic picture appears 
somewhat more favourable.  
World trade developments in the decade before 
the crisis were marked by the integration into the 
world economy of large and dynamic emerging 
markets, in particular the BRICs. Due to a 
different level of economic development, their 
export structure is rather different from that of 
industrialised economies (see Box I.2). This 
export structure is changing rapidly over time and 
is becoming more similar to that of advanced 
economies. The change has been particularly 
visible in China, which has been rapidly changing 
its export structure towards more research 
intensive goods and ICT products in particular.  
In the US and Japan, the counterpart to the 
changing product structure in emerging markets' 
exports has been a steady loss (particularly in 
Japan) in the comparative advantage in ICT 
industries. In contrast, and rather surprisingly, the 
euro-area export structure has remained 
remarkably stable over time. This is true for both 
labour-intensive exports, where the euro area has 
kept its slight comparative advantage, and ICT 
exports, where the comparative disadvantage has 
persisted, but markets shares remained rather 
stable. At the same time, comparative advantage 
in the broad high-technology sectors (which 
includes ICT) has even increased slightly.  
The rapid development of communication 
technologies and a fall in transport costs have 
enabled multinational companies to split up 
production process internationally, offshore some 
stages of production or even individual tasks. (3) 
These trends are boosting bilateral trade in 
intermediate goods and components. For this 
reason, any analysis of export structure needs to 
be complemented by an analysis of trade balances 
as an apparently strong competitiveness position 
on the basis of export data may conceal increasing 
outsourcing and deteriorating trade balances.  
A closer look at trade balances indeed points to a 
weaker position of the US and Japan in the ICT 
sector, suggesting that their strong export 
performance in this sector is built on rising 
                                                        
(3) Baldwin, R. (2006), “Globalisation: the great unbundling(s)”, 
Prime Minister’s Office, Economic Council of Finland. 
Grossman, G. E. Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Trading tasks: a 
simple theory of offshoring”, NBER Working Paper 12721.  
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outsourcing. However, trade balance data do not 
alter the picture significantly for the euro area, 
with exception of the sector 'easy to imitate 
research intensive goods'. In this sector the 
persistent comparative advantage of the euro area 
on the basis of export data has come at the 
expense of a deteriorating trade balance.  
… has been compensated by a strong position 
in some key sectors… 
The fact that the euro area lacks clear competitive 
advantages in terms of factor or technology 
intensities seems to be at odds with its relatively 
good performance in terms of market shares. The 
apparent puzzle is due to the fact that growth in 
world trade before the crisis is not 
straightforwardly associated with any specific 
factor or technology intensity. Although trade in 
high-tech industries such as ICT or 
pharmaceuticals indeed grew fast, other, lower-
tech sectors such as metals or chemicals also 
recorded fast rates of growth.  
Moreover, euro-area exporters have done well in 
some sectors that constitute a large part of euro-
area exports. These are both high-tech sectors 
such as pharmaceuticals, which were one of the 
fastest-growing manufacturing sectors before the 
crisis, but also medium-tech sectors such as 
machinery or cars, where growth in world trade 
was around average for manufacturing goods. The 
euro area’s market shares in these sectors 
remained more stable or increased faster than in 
the case of US or Japan. The robust performance, 
together with large size, made these sectors 
powerful engines of euro-area exports. 
… and steady improvements in product quality  
An additional strength of euro-area exports is their 
positioning in high-quality segments within a 
given product group. The fact that euro-area 
exporters increased market shares in some 
industries, where competition is high both from 
advanced economies (such as pharmaceuticals or 
machinery) or from emerging economies (such as 
metalworking or labour-intensive sectors in 
general) at a time of an appreciating currency 
suggest strong gains in non-price competitiveness. 
Indeed, there is some evidence that euro-area 
exporters have secured strong positions in high-
price segments across various sectors thanks to 
their capacity to sell high-quality products. To the 
best of our knowledge no empirical study is 
available for the euro area as a whole, but data for 
the EU show that European producers tend to be 
positioned more upmarket than their US or 
Japanese counterparts and that the importance of 
 high quality products in total exports is 
increasing (see Curran and Zignago (2009) or 
Baldwin and Ito (2008)). (4) This up-market 
positioning has, at least so far, partly shielded 
euro-area exports from competition of emerging 
economies and can, in particular, explain 
relatively high and stable specialisation in labour-
intensive goods.  
Overall, the above assessment paints a mixed 
picture of the euro area's export structure. On the 
one hand, euro-area exporters managed to perform 
relatively well in pre-crisis years, compared to 
other advanced economies. This was due to strong 
world demand in sectors where the euro area had 
a strong specialisation but also to further gains in 
market shares and high product quality. 
Nevertheless, the relatively low specialisation in 
high-tech goods and especially in ICT products 
and higher specialisation in labour-intensive ones 
is a potential weak spot and could weigh on 
export performance in the future. 
I.2. Trade developments during the crisis 
The financial and economic crisis caused a very 
sharp fall in world trade.(5) According to CPB 
data, the volume of world goods trade fell peak 
to-trough by 18 % between 2008Q1 and 2009Q1.  
Exports of the euro area, which is closely 
integrated with the world economy, followed a 
similar path. Eurostat’s trade statistics show that 
extra-euro-area export volumes fell by almost 
22% peak to trough (2008Q1-2009Q2). Euro-
area’s main competitors were also affected, but to 
a different extent. The peak-to-trough fall in US 
exports (2008Q3-2009Q2) was similar to the euro 
area’s, while Japan’s exports slumped by 40% 
(2008Q1-2009Q1). Meanwhile, exports of 
emerging economies were comparatively resilient 
falling by 15% peak-to-trough (2008Q2-2009Q1). 
Euro-area exports to all geographical regions were 
affected by the crisis, led by some hard-hit 
European countries and some very open south-
east  Asian  economies.   There  were  pronounced  
                                                        
(4) Curran, L. and S. Zignago (2009), 'The evolution of EU and 
its Member States' competitiveness in international trade', 
report prepared by CEPII-CREM ATLASS consortium, DG 
Trade, European Commission. 
 Baldwin, R.E. and T. Ito (2008), 'Quality competition versus 
price competition goods: An empirical classification', NBER 
Working Papers 14305. 
(5) For the analysis of the slump in world trade and its impact on 
the euro area see Quarterly Report on the Euro Area No 
3/2009. 
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Box I.2: Export development of the BRICs
The growing role of emerging market economies, in particular the role of China and India, is one of the most 
outstanding economic transformations in the past decade. Recently, as the world economies are emerging from the 
deepest crisis since the Great Depression, this ascent is reflected in the BRICs' (1) (Brazil, Russia, India, China) 
contribution to GDP growth and in encouraging growth prospects in the coming years (2). By 2015, using IMF 
forecasts, the BRICs are to reach 29% of global GDP (based on PPP), with the EU and the US falling further.  
Export compositions by product groups 
(in % of total exports) Share in world trade (in %) 
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Source: Commission services. Source: Commission services. 
 
Between 1995 and 2009, the share of BRICs in world trade has increased markedly, particularly for China and India, 
mirroring growth developments in these emerging economies. As a result, China now accounts for 8% of total world 
trade and India 2% while the respective shares of the other BRICs remain smaller (see right panel of the chart 
above). A noteworthy feature of BRICs' trade is the rising importance of intra-BRICs trade since 2000. On average, 
total intra-BRICs trade has doubled since 2000, up from around 6% to around 12% of their total trade (3). Another 
noteworthy feature is the heterogeneity of the product composition of trade across the four countries. As illustrated 
in the left panel of the graph above, the share of manufactured goods in total exports of goods is comparable to the 
world average (about 75%) only in the case of India. In Brazil and Russia, this share is much lower, due to the 
importance of commodity exports in the goods exported by these countries. China stands out as exporting almost 
exclusively manufactured goods. The heterogeneity is even larger for intra-BRICs trade: typically, the commodity 
content of exports from other BRICs to China is much larger than to the rest of the world, except in the case of 
Russia. One caveat, however, in assessing recent trade developments for BRICs (including intra-regional), is the 
large commodity content of exports. The recovery in commodity prices since the start of 2009 translates into 
increasing trade values between BRICs, but this does not necessarily correspond to an increase in real terms. 
The changing composition of the exports of the BRICs over time shows evidence that some of these economies have 
been moving up the value chain.(4) The first table hereafter illustrates this move up the value chain in the cases of 
China and India. In these two countries the share of research intensive goods in total exports has increased 
substantially since the mid-1990s, particularly for the "easy to imitate" sub-category but also, in the case China, for 
the "difficult to imitate" one. These gains have been mostly achieved at the expense of the share of labour intensive 
goods. Similar, although smaller changes are visible in Brazil, while Russia have increased their comparative 
advantage in primary sectors. The second table hereafter shows a clear move towards higher-tech industries in 
China, Brazil and to lesser extent India, while Russia remain positioned in the medium-tech industries.  
In sum, emerging market economies are a major driving force in the recovery of the world economy, but they 
constitute a rather heterogeneous aggregate. In future these economies will likely gain more economic weight while 
the currently advanced countries will see their relative weight further decline in world GDP. Going forward, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
(1) Goldman Sachs’ 2003 economic paper on “The Building BRICs for the World Economy to come”. 
(2) Commission spring forecasts estimate that the GDP of BRICs grew by 3½ in 2009, while in the countries of the G20 GDP 
contracted by 2%. In 2010 and 2011, BRIC countries are expected to grow by 7½-8% while G20 countries are seen to achieve 
3½% GDP growth in these years.   
(3) Source: IMF DOTS data. 
(4) Similar conclusions are found in the literature, see Baumann, R., R. Araujo and J. Ferreira (2010), 'As Relações Comerciais do 
Brasil com os demais BRICs', ECLAC Working Paper LC/BRS/R.221, CEPAL, Brasilia, February.  
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differences in developments in various product 
groups. On the one hand, non-cyclical sectors, 
such as food, beverages or pharmaceuticals 
proved relatively resilient, while trade in raw 
materials and manufacturing collapsed. Services 
were overall more resilient than goods, but 
exports of transport and financial services were 
also severely affected.  
After a broadly flat second quarter of 2009, world 
trade staged an impressive upturn and by end-
2009 was growing by 11% compared with the 
trough in 2009Q1. High frequency data show that 
the momentum continued further early 2010.  
Euro-area exports have also recovered. The 
recovery has been concentrated in Asia 
(particularly China and India), Latin America and 
Australia. Other markets, including main euro-
area trade destinations, such as other EU 
countries, Russia and the US have lagged behind. 
For some markets, the seemingly sluggish 
recovery is a reflection of their relative resilience 
during the fall in trade at the beginning of 2009. 
This is the case for Africa and OPEC as well as 
EFTA, although to a lesser extent. Among EU 
destinations, the differences in dynamics have 
been very large: Poland, Romania and Sweden 
have been recovering vigorously, while the Baltic 
countries, after a massive fall in 2009, have 
remained broadly flat (Table I.4). 
 
Table I.4: Euro-area export growth to various 
destinations (volumes - % change) 
2008Q1-2009Q1 2009Q1-2009Q4
Intra euro area -20.4 5.4
Extra-euro area -21.3 5.5
Non-euro-area EU -25.3 5.1
Non-euro-area Recent
Member States (1) -27.2 6.1
UK -24.3 4.6
EFTA -11.2 1.1
CIS -36.9 1.2
Russia -37.6 3.1
Africa 1.8 -1.3
US -23.8 0.5
Latin America -23.3 14.8
Brazil -22.0 28.7
ASEAN (2) -20.1 12.8
China (3) -13.0 21.8
Japan -26.6 8.1
India -24.1 26.8
Near and Middle East (4) -13.5 -0.7
Australia and Oceania -20.6 12.9
OPEC -0.4 -5.7
(1) Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia; (2) Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam; (3) Excluding Hong Kong; (4) Israel, United 
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Box (continued) 
 
BRICs will certainly remain the focus of analysts, while other dynamic emerging economies may also deserve 
further attention (e.g. South Africa or Indonesia). 
Balassa index of reveladed comparative advantage (1995-2007) 
  Brazil China India Russia 
  Average Change Average Change Average Change Average Change 
Factor intensity 
Research intensive         
- difficult to imitate  0.57 0.09 0.65 0.37 0.25 0.22 0.23 -0.12 
- easy to imitate 0.40 0.01 1.30 0.92 0.53 0.13 0.19 -0.12 
Capital intensive 1.38 -0.27 0.48 0.06 0.65 0.21 1.15 -0.51 
Labour intensive 0.73 -0.16 2.23 -0.41 2.61 -0.38 0.26 -0.04 
Raw materials 
intensive 2.09 -0.20 0.46 -0.52 1.17 -0.07 3.36 0.05 
Technology content 
High tech 0.40 0.22 0.71 0.77 0.33 0.15 0.35 -0.02 
- of which ICT 0.18 0.08 1.01 1.32 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.00 
Medium-high tech 0.79 0.11 0.57 0.19 0.45 0.27 0.69 0.02 
Medium-low tech 1.21 -0.39 1.04 -0.02 0.86 0.38 3.16 -0.55 
Low tech 1.62 0.13 1.84 -0.56 2.41 -0.43 0.58 -0.11 
Source: Commission services. 
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These differences in the geographical distribution 
of the pick-up in trade activity have translated into 
differences in the strengths of the recovery in the 
euro area and its competitors. While euro-area 
exports grew by 5.5% between 2009Q1 and 
2009Q4, US exports increased by 13% and Japan 
by 34%. These differences reflect a much bigger 
exposure of the US and Japan to the dynamic 
regions of Latin America and Asia. 
 
Table I.5: Euro-area exports of goods: 
sectoral breakdown (volumes - % change) 
2008Q1-2009Q1 2009Q1-2009Q4
Food and beverages -7.6 3.3
Raw materials -20.2 21.7
Crude materials, exc 
fuels -22.0 24.0
Manufactured goods -24.4 7.0
Chemicals -10.2 8.7
Machinery and transport 
equip. -29.3 6.8
Other manufactured 
goods -24.1 6.1
Source: Commission services. 
 
Looking at the various trade sectors, the recovery 
has so far been more evenly distributed across 
products than the slump. The only sector that 
stands out for growing much faster than other 
product groups is crude materials excluding fuels 
(SITC 2), which includes such products as rubber 
and metalliferous ores. Manufactured goods have 
been recovering faster than food, but the 
difference has not been as pronounced as during 
the slump. Also, the differences among various 
manufacturing sectors have been rather limited. 
Services, where the impact of the crisis was more 
muted than for goods, do not yet seem to have 
registered a recovery.  
I.3. Looking ahead: what are the 
medium term challenges in a post-
crisis world? 
The trade recovery is now gathering momentum 
on the back of strong import demand in emerging 
markets. Euro-area exports will be further 
stimulated by the recent depreciation of the euro. 
Since its peak last October, the euro's real 
effective exchange rate has lost close to 10%. 
Based on the estimates provided in Box I.1, the 
depreciation, if it persists, could boost exports by 
about 5%, with much of the gains taking place 
already in 2010. (6)  
                                                        
(6) Although the depreciation is likely to have a positive impact 
on exports and hence growth in the short term, its longer-term 
This is probably a conservative estimate based on 
relatively low estimates of the price elasticity of 
euro-area exports. As discussed further in Box I.3, 
recent empirical research has pointed to much 
larger estimates of trade price elasticities at the 
sectoral than at the aggregate macroeconomic 
level. This could indicate the existence of a 
downward bias in aggregate macroeconomic 
estimates and suggests that the sensitivity of euro-
area exports to exchange rate fluctuations could 
be higher than the estimates presented in Box I.1. 
Recent positive developments in exports and 
competitiveness should, however, not breed 
complacency. The crisis is indeed likely to leave a 
persistent mark on the structure of world trade. 
The euro area's export performance has proven to 
be relatively robust in pre-crisis years but euro-
area exporters now face at least three important 
medium-term challenges: the emergence of the 
BRICs as the main driving force of world trade, 
an ongoing deleveraging trend in some parts of 
the world and possible excess supply in key 
sectors. The euro area's export performance in the 
medium term will in part depend on how 
successful euro-area exporters will be in tackling 
these challenges.  
The BRICs are likely to turn progressively into 
the main driving force of world trade 
Emerging markets have played a key role in the 
recent recovery of world trade and are projected 
to become its main driving forces. For instance, 
according to the latest IMF World Economic 
Outlook, the BRICs are likely to account for 29% 
of world GDP by 2015 (on a PPP basis), against 
24% in 2009. The same four countries are set to 
deliver more than 40% of world real GDP growth 
over the period, with all emerging markets 
combined accounting for close to 70% (Table I.6.)  
As discussed in Box I.2, the BRICs form a 
relatively heterogeneous group. Their export 
specialisation is still rather different from that of 
industrialised economies as they show a relative 
specialisation in labour-intensive, raw materials-
intensive as well as medium- and low-technology 
goods. However, the emergence of the BRICs has 
several noteworthy implications for euro-area 
exporters. 
 
                                                                                  
impact on GDP is less certain, as the depreciation seems to be 
associated with increased risk premia. 
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First, despite very high investment rates (at least 
in China and India), emerging economies have 
comparatively low capital stocks.(7) Convergence 
processes will require sustained high levels of 
investment. Monthly export data do not yet point 
to significant product differences in the strength 
of the recovery but surveys clearly show a 
stronger improvement of manufacturers' export 
expectations for investment goods than for other 
goods. A rebalancing of world growth towards 
"capital hungry" emerging markets constitutes an 
opportunity for euro-area exporters of machinery 
and equipment who have shown a persistently 
strong competitive position in recent years.  
Second, rapid growth in emerging economies and 
notably in the BRICs will fuel private 
consumption in these regions. This will in turn 
affect the composition of world trade in 
consumption goods. Whereas rapid growth will 
generate new demand for luxury goods in 
emerging markets, a traditional stronghold of 
euro-area manufacturers, its most important 
implication will probably be the rapid emergence 
of a middle class with rising but still relatively 
moderate purchasing power. Meeting such 
demand will also require manufacturing low-cost 
consumption goods, a segment on which euro-
area exporters – with a strength in high-quality 
high-price goods – may not be very well 
positioned.  
Finally, the emergence of the BRICs will also 
have implications on the supply side. As 
highlighted in Section I.1 and in Box I.2, there is 
already evidence that China and India have been 
changing their export structure since the mid-
1990s, with a significant increase in the share of 
                                                        
(7) Although pockets of over-investment cannot be excluded in 
countries such as China due to heavy investment subsidies in 
some privileged sectors (notably export sectors).  
research intensive goods and ICT in total exports, 
as well as a decreasing share of labour intensive 
goods. There is also ample anecdotal evidence 
that emerging economies are boosting their 
business innovation capacity with a view to 
producing goods of medium to high quality at low 
prices.(8) Although euro-area exporters have so 
far coped relatively well with the moving 
upmarket of some emerging countries, 
competitive pressures may well rise substantially 
further in some market segments where the euro 
area has traditionally shown a competitive 
advantage. 
The ongoing deleveraging trend in some parts 
of the world will weigh on demand 
The global financial crisis has entailed a partial 
unwinding of global imbalances. In particular, 
rising risk premia and changing attitudes towards 
risks have triggered a deleveraging process in 
some advanced and emerging economies (mostly 
European) which had accumulated high levels of 
private or public sector debt and significant 
current account deficits. In these countries, 
protracted deleveraging processes in the private 
sector or fiscal consolidation are likely to weigh 
on domestic demand in the years to come. 
A persistent deleveraging trend could be a 
handicap for euro-area exporters which have 
traditionally been strong suppliers to a range of 
countries which entered the crisis with sizeable 
deleveraging needs and/or current account 
deficits. 
 
                                                        
(8) There is in particular evidence of competition from cheap 
products in sectors such as cars, computers and mobile 
phone. See The Economist, 'The World turned upside down', 
A special report on innovation in emerging markets, April 
17th 2010. 
 
Table I.6: Projected contribution to world growth, BRICs (in pp – 2009 to 2015) (1) 
Growth
Country Based on US$ Based on PPP 2010-15 Based on US$ Based on PPP
Brazil 2.7 2.9 4.3 0.1 0.1
China 8.5 12.5 9.8 0.8 1.2
India 2.1 5.1 8.2 0.2 0.4
Russia 2.1 3.0 4.1 0.1 0.1
BRICs 15.4 23.5 1.2 1.9
Emerging and developing 
economies 46.1 6.6 3.0
World 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.5
Shares in 2009 world GDP Contribution to 2010-15 growth
Source: IMF. 
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On average, euro-area export destinations are 
running current account deficits, notably in large 
trading partners such as the US and the UK but 
also in a large part of the new EU Member States.  
The impact of the deleveraging will weigh on 
import dynamics of euro-area trading partners. 
Graph I.4 shows that external demand is projected 
to grow less rapidly for the euro-area than for the 
US and Japan in 2010-11.  
 
 
Box I.3: Aggregate versus disaggregated estimation of trade elasticities
Trade elasticites are key parameters in evaluating the trade balance effect of exchange rate movements. The 
Marshall-Lerner conditions state that starting from a balanced external position and under the assumption of full 
pass-through, depreciating exchange rates improve the trade balance only if the sum of the absolute value of export 
and import elasticities is above unity. However, trade elasticity estimates are far from robust and there is an 
important difference in magnitude between estimates based on aggregate and disaggregated data. 
Most empirical analyses using aggregate trade data obtain trade elasticities around unity, but in some cases values 
well below one can be found as well. Estimated elasticities vary quite widely depending on sample and 
methodology, as the extensive review of Goldstein and Kahn (1985) demonstrates. Box I.1 in this section presents 
estimates of a long-run export price elasticity of 0.5 for the euro area, while the ECB Area Wide Model uses an 
elasticity derived from an estimated export equation of about 0.6. Di Mauro et al. (2008) report a price elasticity of 
0.6 for the period 2000 to 2007, down from an estimated 1.05 prior to 2000. Similarly, low values between 0.5 and 
0.6 are found in recent IMF estimates of the export elasticity for the United States. 
In contrast, studies using disaggregated data at industry level find considerably higher response of trade volumes to 
relative price changes. To the best of our knowledge, these disaggregated studies have so far focused mostly on 
import elasticities but their general conclusions appear to hold for export elasticities as well. Kee, Nicita and 
Olarreaga (2008) estimate import price elasticities for more than 100 countries at the HS6 product category 
disaggregation and obtain an average estimated import elasticity of 3.12, with standard deviation of 8. Broda, Limao 
and Weinstein (2008) estimate import demand and export supply elasticites at highly disaggregated level based on 
the methodology of Feenstra (1994). These results also confirm the high average elasticites at disaggregated level 
and the large dispersion of these elasticites across products. Using the same methodology, Imbs and Mejean (2009) 
estimate industry-level import elasticities for the US. One added value of this analysis is that it aggregates the 
industry specific elasticites into a theoretically-founded, macro import elasticity, which is estimated to equal 4.5. 
Imbs and Mejean (2009) also show that not allowing for industry-level elasticities, but rather assuming a common 
elasticity similarly to aggregate studies results in a macro elasticity of 2. This indicates that aggregation bias can 
play an important role, just as suggested by Orcutt (1950): “Goods with relatively low price elasticities can display 
the largest variation in prices and therefore exert a dominant effect on the estimated aggregate price elasticity, 
thereby biasing the estimate downwards". 
References: 
Broda, C., N. Limão and D. E. Weinstein (2008), "Optimal tariffs and market power: The evidence", American 
Economic Review, Vol. 98(5), pp. 2032-65. 
Feenstra, R. C. (1994), "New product varieties and the measurement of international prices", American Economic 
Review, Vol. 84(1), pp. 157-77. 
Goldstein, M. and M. Kahn (1985), "Income and price effects in foreign trade", in R.W. Jones and P. Kenen (eds.), 
Handbook of International Economics, Vol II, Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Imbs, J. and I. Mejean (2009), "Elasticity optimism", CEPR Discussion Paper 7177. 
Kee, H., A. Nicita and M. Olarreaga (2008), "Import demand elasticities and trade distortions", The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 90(4), pp. 666-682. 
di Mauro, F., R. Rueffer and I. Bunda (2008), "The changing role of the exchange rate in a globalised economy", 
ECB Occasional Paper Series, No. 94. 
Orcutt, G. (1950), "Measurement of price elasticities in international trade", Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. 32, pp. 117-32. 
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Graph I.4: Forecast foreign demand growth 
2010-11 (average annual growth in %) (1) 
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(1) Export-weighted foreign real imports of goods and services in 
major trading partners. Commission Spring 2010 Forecast. 
Source: Commission services. 
Signs on excess supply in some key sectors  
The global financial crisis has left deep scars in 
some industrial sectors, exacerbating structural 
weaknesses and forcing a – partly necessary – 
restructuring. This is obviously true for the 
housing and financial sectors but also, and more 
problematically so (for euro-area exports), in the 
automotive industry. This latter sector has been an 
important driver of euro-area export growth in the 
years preceding the crisis, accounting for more 
than 10% of overall growth in exports of goods. 
The automotive industry is however facing 
structural overcapacity problems in Europe as 
well as in the US and Japan and these problems 
have been magnified by the crisis.(9)  
Graph I.5: Automotive production, euro area 
(index 2005=100 – Jan. 2005 to Apr. 2010) 
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Source: Commission services. 
                                                        
(9) See for instance European Commission (2009), 'Responding 
to the crisis in the European automotive industry', 
Communication from the Commission COM(2009) 104 final.  
Despite a rebound since the middle of 2009, 
output in the automotive sector in March this year 
was still 24% lower than at its pre-crisis peak 
(16% in the case of manufacturing as a whole) 
(Graph I.5). Competitive pressures in the sector 
are likely to intensify in the years to come, in 
particular with the emergence of low-cost 
producers in some emerging countries. 
I.4. Conclusion 
Euro–area exporters have performed relatively 
well during the period spanning the launch of the 
euro up to onset of the global economic crisis. 
Notwithstanding a substantial appreciation of the 
euro's real effective exchange rate, losses in 
market share were more contained than for other 
major advanced economies such as the US or 
Japan. Euro-area exporters benefited from a 
strong position in fast-growing destinations such 
as Russia and new EU Member States, which 
more than offset a comparatively weaker position 
in other emerging markets and in the Chinese 
market in particular. Overall, the euro area 
benefited from a slightly more supportive 
geographical specialisation than the US or Japan.  
Judging by traditional indicators of revealed 
comparative advantage, the sectoral structure of 
euro-area exports does not appear very conducive 
to growth. The region shows a stronger 
specialisation in labour-intensive goods than the 
US or Japan and a weaker specialisation in 
research-intensive and ICT sectors. Nevertheless, 
euro-area exporters performed well in some key 
export sectors, most notably pharmaceuticals, 
machinery and transport, which acted as powerful 
export drivers. There is also evidence that 
exporters have weathered the competition by 
raising product quality.  
Notwithstanding a relatively good pre-crisis 
performance, euro-area exporters have been 
strongly affected by the crisis. Although world 
trade is now recovering on the back of fast growth 
in emerging economies, the euro area faces a 
number of medium-term challenges. These 
include the shift of the driving force of world 
trade from advanced to emerging economies with 
potential strong implications both on the supply 
and the demand side. The crisis has also triggered 
a deleveraging process that will have a lasting 
negative impact on domestic demand in some 
important trade destinations. Finally, the crisis has 
also highlighted the existence of structural 
imbalances in some key export sectors such as the 
transport sector. 
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II.1. Quantifying the causes of the crisis 
in the euro area 
The financial crisis that started in 2007 was of an 
unprecedented scale in post-war economic 
history. It was marked by the biggest drop of GDP 
since the Great Depression and affected virtually 
all sectors. It also triggered a strong policy 
response from governments, which helped in 
saving economies from a complete collapse.  
A number of factors contributed to the crisis. 
There is wide agreement that buoyant credit 
growth, excessive leverage and historically low 
levels of risk premia in the US but also in various 
European countries drove the boom and 
contributed to a property bubble, which eventually 
burst and revealed severe problems in an over-
leveraged banking sector.(10) There is also little 
doubt that the globalized financial sector was one 
of the main channels through which the crisis was 
transmitted outside the United States.(11) Other 
plausible factors include the bursting of the stock 
market bubble, global imbalances and possibly a 
sudden revision of productivity growth 
expectations in the US (see Kahn and Rich 2007 
and Kahn 2009).(12) 
                                                        
(10) European Commission (2009), 'Economic crisis in Europe: 
Causes, consequences and responses', European Economy, 
July. European Commission (2009) 'Annual Report on the 
Euro Area 2009' 
(11) European Commission (2009) ibid. 
(12) Kahn, J. A. (2009). 'Productivity swings and housing prices', 
Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Vol. 15(3), 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Kahn, J. A. and R. W. 
Rich (2007), 'Tracking the new economy: using growth 
theory to detect changes in trend productivity', Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Vol. 54, pp. 1670-1701. 
Macro models can be used to quantify the relative importance of various factors in explaining the recent 
recession in the euro area. An analysis based on the latest version of the Commission's QUEST III model 
shows that the drop in euro-area GDP after the middle of 2008 can be explained by a number of factors, in 
particular a strong fall in productivity and a decline of investment. While the decline of investment was 
common to both the euro area and the US and linked to deteriorating financial conditions, the cyclical 
behaviour of productivity contrasted strongly between the euro area and the US, signalling a very different 
response of the labour market to the crisis. The slump in world trade played an important role in deepening the 
recession. In contrast, the bursting of the housing bubble and the tightening of credit conditions for households 
had only a relatively moderate impact on the euro-area economic performance. The modelling exercise also 
shows the stabilising role of fiscal stimulus packages in the euro area.  
Business cycle convergence is an important ingredient to a smooth functioning of the euro area. While cyclical 
synchronisation has remained high in the euro area since its inception - i.e. Member States' cyclical peaks and 
troughs have remained closely aligned – a period of cyclical dispersion took place during 2006-2008. It marks 
an accentuation of differences in business cycle amplitudes with historically high positive output gaps in 
Ireland, Greece, Spain and Finland. Elevated private demand supported by excessive credit growth was the 
main driver of the increase in output gaps in the first three of these countries, whereas strong exports fostered 
by booming world trade played a central role in Finland. Business cycle convergence increased again during 
the financial crisis as deleveraging triggered a sharper drop in demand and in activity in IE, EL and ES than in 
the rest of the euro area and as the slump in world trade took a heavy toll on Finland. The convergence may, 
however, be only temporary and diverging forces could resurface in the medium-term. In IE, EL and ES, both 
supply and demand are likely to be durably affected by the ongoing deleveraging process and these Member 
States could face a protracted period of sluggish growth relative to the rest of the euro area, leading again to a 
period of higher output gap differences within the euro area.  
Economic theory suggests that price competitiveness is only one of the factors affecting export performance but 
relatively few empirical analyses include non-price competitiveness factors among its determinants. The 
objective of this section is to illustrate the role that some non-price competitiveness factors can have in 
explaining export performance. The focus is on competitiveness drivers related to innovation and the business 
environment, the former captured as R&D intensity and the latter as enforcement contracts conditions. The 
results show that innovative economies with favourable conditions for doing business export more, confirming 
that understanding better export performance requires going beyond traditional determinants such as external 
demand and price competitiveness. 
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While it is likely that all these factors contributed 
to the slump, their relative importance is much 
less obvious. This comment applies both to the 
crisis in the US and, perhaps even more 
significantly to the euro area, where idiosyncratic 
factors might have played an important role. 
These include, for example, domestic property 
and stock market bubbles but also external 
conditions, like the slump in foreign demand. This 
section describes the results of an attempt to 
quantify the relative importance of these factors 
for both the boom and the bust in the Euro area.  
 
Looking more closely at a range of possible 
supply and demand factors 
For this analysis we use the latest estimation of 
the QUEST III model for the euro area that 
includes data up to the last quarter of 2009. The 
structure of the QUEST III variant used for the 
estimation allows to account for the standard 
supply and demand factors that affect the 
economic cycle, like TFP growth, monetary 
policy or fiscal policy, as well as factors whose 
prominence has been fully recognized only in the 
current financial crisis, namely stock market and 
housing bubbles as well as changing credit market 
Graph II.1.1: Developments in underlying shocks to key model variables (2000-2010) 
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conditions.(13) The evolution of some of these 
variables, as identified by the model, is depicted 
in Graph II.1.1. 
The model generates a path for households' access 
to mortgage credit, which shows a strongly 
cyclical pattern in lending conditions. After the 
dot-com bubble burst in 2001 there was a very 
rapid deterioration of households' access to credit 
in the euro area. It reached a trough in 2004 and 
then was followed by a gradual improvement of 
access conditions with a peak in the 2nd half of 
2007. It is worth noting that the 2007 peak was 
visibly below the peak observed during the dot-
com bubble in 2000-2001. This suggests that lax 
credit policy by banks in the euro area was not a 
major factor for the boom preceding the crisis. 
Households' access to credit has tightened again 
since the 2nd half of 2007 in the euro area, 
however, the pace of the tightening appears to be 
slowing down. 
The monetary policy in the model is driven by a 
standard Taylor rule. Taylor rule assumes that the 
interest rate systematically adjusts to changes in 
inflation and output. The shock to monetary 
policy is then identified in the model by 
deviations of the actual policy rate from the 
interest rate implied by the Taylor rule. Positive 
deviations are interpreted as restrictive policy 
stance, while negative deviations suggest 
expansionary stance.14 As can be seen in 
Graph II.1.1., the magnitude of the shocks during 
the recession remained subdued. This suggests 
that policy interest rate in the euro area did not 
deviate much from the one implied by the 
developments in output and inflation. 
Asset price bubbles have been blamed for having 
played an important role in the recent boom-bust 
cycle. Two distinct estimates of possible bubbles 
related to corporate and housing investment are 
given in Graph II.1.1. Bubbles are identified as 
declining risk premia for corporate and housing 
investment respectively. A continuous fall of risk 
premia is an indication of the build up of a bubble, 
                                                        
(13) For the detailed description of the structure of a similar 
model estimated for the US as well as the empirical strategy 
followed to identify bubbles and financial constraints see 
Ratto M, W. Roeger and J. in ’t Veld (2010), 'Using a DSGE 
model to look at the recent boom-bust cycle in the US', 
European Economy Economic Paper, no. 397.  
(14) Note that according to this definition near-zero policy rate 
does not necessarily imply expansionary policy; such a rate 
can also be consistent with deflation or strongly negative 
output growth. 
while a rapid increase points to a bursting of a 
bubble.(15)  
As can be seen from Graph II.1.1 there was no 
strong indication of a bubble on the euro area 
stock markets in the period directly preceding the 
outbreak of the financial crisis. On the other hand, 
the pronounced increase in the risk premium 
observed during the crisis reflects a sudden 
pessimism of investors and a flight to safety 
which is not entirely explained by economic 
fundamentals. 
By contrast, there is some evidence of a house 
price bubble, with house market premia slowly 
starting to decrease already in 2003 and dropping 
sharply between the 2nd half of 2004 and the 
beginning of 2007. Since 2007 (and preceding the 
onset of the global economic crisis), house price 
risk premia have been rising sharply, which is 
consistent with the view that the house price 
bubble started to deflate in 2007. It should be 
noted though that the estimated magnitude of the 
fluctuations in risk premia for the euro area is 
considerably smaller than what was estimated on 
US data.(16) This is suggestive of a much sharper 
boom-bust cycle in housing markets in the US.  
According to the results of our estimation, the 
growth rate of the euro area Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) in the period between 2000 
and the last quarter of 2009 has been significantly 
below its pre-2000 level.(17) The decline in TFP 
further accelerated towards the end of 2008 with 
the start of the recession. This deterioration in 
productivity is likely to have a cyclical character  
 
                                                        
(15) More technically, shares and housing investment in QUEST 
III are priced according to standard arbitrage conditions that 
require the current price of an asset to be linked to the present 
discounted value of the income stream from owning this asset 
in the future. However, unlike more traditional models, 
QUEST III does not impose that the current price is exactly 
equal to the present discounted value of investment. A non-
zero difference between the two can be interpreted as an 
additional risk premium. To the extent that this risk premium 
does not reflect economic fundamentals, it can be associated 
with the emergence of a bubble. 
(16) See Ratto M, W. Roeger and J. in ’t Veld (2010), ibid. Euro 
area averages, however, potentially hide more pronounced 
house price volatility in a limited number of individual 
Member States.  
(17) The TFP shock shown in the graph is defined as the 
logarithm of TFP de-trended using the average TFP growth 
rate calculated over the whole period of estimation (1990-
2009). The visible downward trend that resulted from this 
transformation suggests that the current TFP growth rates are 
considerably lower than those that prevailed prior to 2000. 
This is consistent with trend estimates using the 
Commissions production function methodology which 
suggests that labour-augmenting TFP growth has fallen by 
roughly 1% since the end of the 1990s. 
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and be linked to at least two crisis-specific 
phenomena: the composition effect and labour 
hoarding. Concerning the first, it is likely that the 
decline in world trade hit especially severely the 
comparatively more productive euro-area 
manufacturing sector, while in the other 
economies (for example the US) the effects of the 
crisis spread across a larger range of sectors or 
may have even hit low productivity sectors more 
severely (e.g. construction). As to the second 
phenomenon, the European labour market is 
characterized by significant labour adjustment 
costs, which prevent European employers from 
easily shedding workers in order to preserve 
competitiveness. This effect was strengthened by 
efforts of European firms to retain qualified 
personnel and policy measures targeted at 
cushioning the impact of the recession on the 
labour market (18). To the extent that these factors 
are mainly cyclical, one could expect that a 
reversal of the TFP decline should accompany the 
end of the recession (19). 
Apart from a small dip immediately after the burst 
of the dot-com bubble, growth in external demand 
during the years 2004-2007 remained relatively 
                                                        
(18) A.Arpaia, N. Curci (2010), EU labour market behaviour 
during the Great Recession, European Economy. Economic 
Papers. 405. 
(19) The model controls for capacity utilisation, but this variable 
alone is unable to pick up all the cyclical factors in the 
economy. 
stable and contributed positively to growth in 
2006-07. However, since the beginning of the 
financial crisis in the 2nd half of 2007, the euro 
area has experienced a series of strong negative 
shocks, with the most unfavourable external 
conditions observed in the last quarter of 2008. In 
the second half of 2009, external demand visibly 
improved, a likely effect of the return to strong 
growth in many emerging economies. 
A model-based GDP growth decomposition 
exercise 
How have the factors identified above contributed 
to GDP growth and inflation over the last 10 
years? The discussion concentrates on the period 
after 2004 which captures both the boom and the 
bust. The decomposition of GDP into its most 
important driving forces can be found in Graph 
II.2.3.  
The results of the estimation reveal that changes 
in households' access to credit as well as housing 
and stock market bubbles only mildly contributed 
to the mini boom of 2004-2007. In 2006 and the 
beginning of 2007, favourable external conditions 
had an additional strongly positive impact on euro  
Graph II.1.2: Contributions to GDP growth (in pp, 2000-2010) 
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area GDP. It is notable that monetary policy 
appears relatively restrictive during the boom (20).  
Also declining TFP growth rates contributed 
negatively to GDP growth over that period. 
Finally, other factors, which have not been 
explicitly accounted for in the decomposition, also 
contributed to GDP growth during this 
period (21).Turning to the recession, the factors 
emphasised at the beginning of this section 
explain almost completely the growth of euro area 
GDP since 2007. Two factors, the slump in total 
factor productivity and the increase in the stock 
market risk premium, are found to have played a 
major role in the 2007-2009 crisis. The former 
effect appears especially strong as it combines, as 
earlier explained, two independent developments: 
a permanent structural fall in TFP trend growth 
rates in euro area in the 2000s and a cyclical 
slump of TFP due to unfavourable composition 
effects and labour hoarding (22). 
The effect of the increase in stock market 
premium is consistent with the previously 
formulated hypothesis that the euro area 
experienced a negative investment shock over that 
                                                        
(20) See footnote 14. 
(21) An important factor is improved labour supply conditions.  
(22) The cyclical effect may still be overestimated due to the 
problems in properly disentangling temporary and lasting 
shocks to TFP. 
period.(23) Unfavourable external conditions, 
presumably having to do with the collapse in 
world trade from the last quarter of 2008 until mid 
2009, appear to have had some negative effect on 
euro-area GDP growth during the crisis. This is 
consistent with the view that factors that 
originated outside the euro area played an 
important role in deepening the recession. By 
contrast, the bursting of the housing bubble and 
the tightening of credit conditions for households 
had a relatively moderate impact on the euro 
area's economic performance. Finally, 
government fiscal packages are found to have had 
a strong positive effect on GDP growth in every 
quarter of 2009, confirming the significance of the 
coordinated European effort for pulling the euro 
area out of the crisis. Fiscal measures began to 
show a detectable impact in the first quarter of 
2009, which suggests a relatively short 
implementation lag. 
The contribution of different shocks to consumer 
price inflation during the decade is shown on 
Graph II.1.3. The graph suggests that in the 
                                                        
(23) In the model as it is specified now, the fall in investment is 
attributed to a rise in the stock market risk premium, but 
unlike in the case of housing investment a further 
decomposition into tightening of lending conditions and a 
negative equity bubble shock is not yet possible. In other 
words, the identified investment shock might reflect 
restricted access to credit as much as the collapse in equity 
markets.  
Graph II.1.3: Contributions to consumer price inflation (in pp, 2000-2010) 
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middle of the decade, the ECB compensated 
negative shocks to inflation arising from the 
external side, subdued investment and credit 
constraints with a slightly expansionary monetary 
stance in order to stabilise inflation around its 
target rate.(24) 
In the period directly preceding the most recent 
crisis, a relaxation of credit conditions led to a 
temporary spike in consumer inflation.(25) During 
the crisis, falling imports prices passed through 
into domestic inflation. The collapse in the stock 
market and the bursting of the housing bubble 
also exerted downward pressure on prices. 
Conclusion  
This section has tried to quantify the importance 
of various factors which are regarded as relevant 
for explaining the recent recession in the euro area 
by using a macro model as an accounting device. 
The analysis shows that financial factors 
contributed positively to growth in the euro area 
prior to the onset of the crisis, but to a smaller 
extent than for private demand in the US. Easier  
  
                                                        
(24) Other important shocks for this period, not shown, include 
the mark-up shocks to prices and wages. 
(25) Another important factor might have been the rapid surge in 
oil and commodity prices in 2007-2008. The current version 
of the estimated Euro Area QUEST III model does, however, 
not incorporate this sector of the economy. The spike in oil 
prices probably explains the positive contribution of the 
"other" factor in Graph II.1.3. 
access to credit by households allowed for higher 
growth between 2005 and 2007 in the order of 
magnitude between 0.2 and 0.6% p.a. But 
especially in 2006 and early 2007 external 
conditions were equally important, while low 
productivity growth exerted a permanent drag on 
growth in the euro area. The analysis also shows 
that over this period, both fiscal and monetary 
policy were mildly countercyclical. The drop in 
euro area GDP since the middle of 2008 is made 
up of a number of factors, in particular a strong 
fall in productivity and a decline in investment. 
While the latter is common to both the euro area 
and the US and linked to stock market 
developments and a tightening of access to credit, 
the cyclical behaviour of productivity contrasts 
strongly between the euro area and the US, 
reflecting a very different response of the labour 
market. External demand had a strong negative 
effect on GDP from the last quarter of 2008 until 
mid 2009, while it contributed positively to 
growth in the last quarter of 2009. The empirical 
results confirm the positive role of fiscal stimulus 
packages for stabilising GDP growth. 
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II.2. How has the financial crisis affected 
cyclical differences within the euro 
area? 
Business cycle convergence between Member 
States is critical for a smooth functioning of 
EMU. It facilitates the coordination of economic 
policies and, in particular, the conduct of a single 
monetary policy. The divergence of business 
cycles makes policy coordination more 
challenging but also more important, and renders 
necessary a more differentiated policy approach in 
policies other than the monetary policy.  
Earlier studies, based on data until 2005, 
concluded that Member States' business cycles 
were relatively closely synchronised and that the 
dispersion in output gaps within the euro area had 
narrowed since the mid-1990s.(26) This section 
provides an up-to-date analysis and discusses how 
cyclical differences have been affected by the 
crisis. It then looks ahead at the prospects of 
business cycle developments in the medium-term. 
The analysis focuses on Ireland, Greece, Spain 
and Finland, as these countries account for much 
of the recent changes in cyclical differences 
within the euro area. 
The empirical literature proposes a wide range of 
statistical instruments to measure differences in 
business cycles. Much of the analysis presented in 
this section relies on one of the most 
straightforward tools to measure cyclical 
differences: the dispersion of output gaps.  
An increase in this measure can, however, reflect 
two broad types of business cycle misalignments: 
a de-synchronisation (countries' cycles move less 
in tandem and differences in the timing of their 
cyclical peaks and troughs increase) or rising 
differences in cyclical amplitudes (cyclical peaks 
and troughs become more pronounced in some 
countries than in others). To better understand the 
underlying sources of (mis-)alignment, additional 
indicators which mostly capture (de)-
synchronisation are also used here. These include 
the correlation of output gaps and comparisons of 
the timing of cyclical peaks and troughs. 
                                                        
(26) The issue has been analysed on three occasions in the 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area:  
- Focus on 'Cyclical synchronisation within the euro area: 
what do recent data tell us?", Vol. 5, No. 2 (2006),  
- Focus on 'Growth differences in the euro area', Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2005),  
- Focus on 'Cyclical convergence in the euro area', Vol. 3, 
No. 2 (2004). 
Cyclical synchronisation has remained high 
within the euro area … 
Updated indicators of cyclical correlation point to 
continuously high or increasing business cycle 
synchronisation within the euro area also after 
2005. (27) Graphs II.2.1 and II.2.2 display the 
mean of the correlations of euro-area Member 
States' business cycles with the overall euro-area 
business cycle. The correlations are calculated for 
4- and 8-year rolling windows, respectively –i.e. 
the number at a given point in time is the 
correlation for the 4 or 8 years to that point.  
Graph II.2.1: Mean output gap correlation, 
euro-area countries (8-year rolling window 
– in % -1983Q1-2009Q4) (1) 
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(1) BE, DE, ES, FR, IT, NL and FI. The mean correlation is 
calculated as the non-weighted average of the correlations 
between the national and the euro-area output gaps. 
Source: Commission services. 
Based on the 8-year window, the correlation of 
business cycles across Member States indicates a 
clear upward trend in the last few years. The 
correlation based on the 4-year rolling window 
shows, however, a less clear picture, with a 
moderate decrease in cyclical synchronisation 
around the years 2005-2006, followed by renewed 
convergence. This shorter window should, 
however, be considered with caution as it tends to 
be sensitive to small deviations in Member States' 
business cycles. In any event, both windows point 
to a very high degree of cyclical synchronisation 
in the euro area. (28)  
                                                        
(27) Throughout this section, the business cycle is measured by 
the output gap, i.e. the deviation from trend GDP in %. The 
trend is extracted using an HP filter. Due to data availability 
issues, the sample is restricted to seven euro-area Member 
States when using quarterly data: Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
Finland, France, Italy and the Netherlands. 
(28) Some caution is however needed as some Member States 
with notably different business cycles could not be included 
in the calculations (e.g. EL and PT) due to lack of data.  
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Graph II.2.2: Mean output gap correlation, euro 
area countries (4-year rolling window  
– in % -1983Q1-2009Q4) (1) 
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(1) BE, DE, ES, FR, IT, NL and FI. The mean correlation is 
calculated as the non-weighted average of the correlations 
between the national and the euro-area output gaps. 
Source: Commission services. 
Survey indicators, such as the Economic 
Sentiment Indicator (ESI), confirm this picture, 
showing that cyclical synchronisation, as 
measured by Member States' similarity in the 
timing of cyclical peaks and troughs, has been on 
the increase in the euro area in recent years 
(Table II.2.1). Synchronisation was particularly 
high during the latest recession and the early 
stages of the ongoing recovery.  
…but there have been some signs of cyclical 
divergence in 2006-2008 
In contrast, measures of cyclical dispersion point 
to some divergence in Member States' business 
cycles within the euro area in 2006-2008 
(Graph II.2.3). The dispersion of output gaps, 
measured by their standard deviation, was 
remarkably low until 2006, when it picked up and 
increased steadily until 2008, reaching a level last 
seen in the early 1990s.  
This phase of divergence was followed by 
renewed convergence as from the second half of 
2008 but to date cyclical differences remain 
significantly higher than over 1999-2005.  
Graph II.2.3: Output gap dispersion, euro area 
(standard deviation as % of GDP 1980–2009) (1) 
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(1) Euro-area countries excluding newly acceded Member States 
(CY, MT, SK and SI). 
Source: Commission services. 
Given that business cycle synchronisation (as 
measured by correlation) has, in the meantime, 
remained high or on un upward trend (depending 
on the windows considered), the business cycle 
divergence over 2006-2008 can only be explained 
by rising Member State differences in the 
amplitude of business cycles.  
Looking more closely at individual Member 
States, much of the divergence can be ascribed to 
four countries: Greece, Spain, Ireland and Finland 
(Graph II.2.3). These countries entered the global 
economic crisis with a significantly higher 
positive output gap than the rest of the euro area 
(Graph II.2.4).  
In the four above-mentioned countries, the large 
positive output gaps in the years preceding the 
crisis are mainly explained by very strong cycles 
of demand (see Graph II.2.5). In Finland, 
however, high exports on the back of booming 
world trade have also played a role. 
 
Table II.2.1: Member State differences in the timing of cyclical peaks and troughs during past recessions, 
euro area (based on the Economic sentiment indicator (ESI)) (1) 
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough
DE(-4) IE(-2) AT(-2) DE(-5) EL(-6) PT(-6) MT(-3) CY(-3)
FR(+2)  FI(+3)    
IT(+3) PT(+9) 
LU(+4) EL(+7)    
FI(+7)
IE(+2) LU(+10)    
NL(+10) PT(+10) 
FI(+10)
IE(+3) IT(+3)
Recession 1989-1993 Recession 2000-2001 Recession 2007-2009
(1) Numbers in brackets refer to quarterly distances from the euro-area peak and trough. A minus (plus) sign means that the country reached 
its peak (trough) after (before) the euro area peak (trough). One quarter distances are not included. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Graph II.2.4: Average output gap  
(in % - 1980–2009) (1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph II.2.5: Average cyclical component of 
domestic demand, euro area  
(in% of trend, 1980–2009) (1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The phase of cyclical divergence in 2006-08 can, 
to a large degree, be traced back to credit markets. 
In all four countries (though somewhat less so in 
Finland and Greece), strong private sector demand 
was supported by strong credit dynamics and 
associated with a sharp increase in private sector 
debt. As shown in Graph II.2.6, the relationship 
between the change in accumulated debt and the 
change in private sector demand is very strong in 
euro-area Member States between 2001 and 2007. 
The cyclical divergence therefore has much of its 
roots in very strong private-sector credit cycles in 
a few Member States. The effects of these credit 
cycles were magnified by overly loose fiscal 
 policy in Greece or high exposure to world trade 
in Finland. 
Graph II.2.6: Relationship between private sector 
debt and private demand (2001-2007) (1) 
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(1) Securities other than shares and loans, non-consolidated data.
(2) Final consumption expenditure and gross capital formation.  
Source: Commission services. 
Business cycle dispersion diminished during 
the crisis… 
With a set of powerful symmetric shocks hitting 
the euro area in 2008, Member States entered the 
downturn almost at the same time (Table II.2.1). 
This meant that synchronisation was particularly 
high during the latest recession and the early 
stages of the ongoing recovery. Only Malta, Italy 
and Ireland had their latest cyclical peak at a 
slightly different time than the euro area as whole. 
In all Member States, except Cyprus, the recovery 
started in 2009Q2. 
However, the fall in output gaps was 
differentiated across euro-area members. Its was 
much higher in those Member States, which 
entered the recession with higher output gaps than 
in the rest of the euro area (IE, EL, ES and FI). As 
a result, business cycle differences narrowed 
significantly on account of reduced differences in 
cyclical amplitudes. 
In Ireland, Greece and Spain, the main factor 
underlying the stronger decline in output gap was 
the larger fall in the cyclical component of 
domestic demand. In Finland, the sharp fall in 
output gap reflected a combination of weak 
domestic demand and the country's high exposure 
to world trade. 
…but could widen again in the medium-term 
In the short term, the financial crisis generated a 
differentiated fall in output gaps, which entailed a 
correction in the pre-crisis divergence. Business 
cycle convergence is expected to continue during 
the recovery period. Output gap dispersion, as 
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measured by standard deviation, is forecast to 
decrease further in 2010 and 2011 and come back 
to levels seen before 2006. (29)  
In the medium term, however, cyclical differences 
could re-emerge. The driving forces behind output 
gap corrections have only started to unfold in 
Ireland, Greece and Spain. Output gaps could 
continue to fall and remain in negative territory 
longer than in the rest of the euro area. The 
possible renewed divergence in business cycles in 
the medium term would be the result of protracted 
structural adjustment processes of private demand 
in indebted countries as debt accumulated by 
households and non-financial corporations is 
progressively reduced.  
 
Table II.2.2: Deviation of consolidated debt (1) 
from the euro-area aggregate in 2008  
(in percentage points) 
Households; non-
profit institutions 
serving households
Non-financial 
corporations Total
Ireland 48 70 118 (2)
Portugal 50 34 85
Spain 39 22 61
Netherlands 5 58 64
Belgium -14 -12 -26
Italy -4 -22 -26
Finland -11 -7 -17
France 0 -11 -11
Austria 0 -9 -9
Germany -15 0 -15
Greece -18 -11 -29
(1) Securities other than shares and loans, expressed in percent 
of GDP. 
(2) For Ireland, non-consolidated liabilities are reported due to 
lack of data. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
No one can determine precisely the speed and 
magnitude of adjustment to debt overshooting. 
Deviations from euro-area aggregate debt levels 
may however give a rough indication of the size 
of the effort needed. For instance, Ireland and 
Portugal show a level of private sector debt that 
is, respectively, 118 and 61 pp higher than the 
euro-area average (Table II.2.2). In order to 
reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio by about 30 to 40 pp 
(about third or half of these differences), the 
adjustment processes in Ireland and Portugal 
would be long-lasting. Ireland would need 3 to 4 
years, assuming an adjustment speed of 11.4% of 
GDP per year (which corresponds to the surplus 
of its private sector balance in 2009) and Spain 
 
 
                                                        
(29) Commission Spring economic forecast 2010. 
would need 5-7 years with a surplus of 6.1% of 
GDP (its private sector surplus in 2009).  
An additional factor expected to slow adjustment 
and contribute to a protracted period of large 
negative output gaps in indebted countries is the 
significant reallocation of supply needed as a 
response to persistent weakness in domestic 
demand. The emergence of substantial excess 
capacity, particularly in the non-tradable sector, 
will most likely take some time to be reallocated 
to other productive uses. Changes in domestic 
relative prices of non-tradables vis-à-vis tradables 
as well as rechanneling of capital and labour 
resources from the non-tradable to the tradable 
sector will need to occur. Price and wage 
flexibility will thus influence the speed of the 
adjustment processes. (30)  
Conclusion 
Business cycle synchronisation is high in the euro 
area, probably reflecting the fact that shocks jhave 
so far been rather symmetrical across euro-area 
Member States. The increase in cyclical 
differences in the period 2006-2008 can mainly be 
attributed to differences in business cycles 
amplitude between Ireland, Greece, Spain and 
Finland, on the one hand, and the rest of the euro 
area, on the other hand. These were in turn driven 
mainly by excessive private demand fostered by 
unprecedented credit growth. The financial crisis 
brought business cycles closer in line due to a 
strong correction in the credit and private demand 
dynamics in Ireland, Greece and Spain. In 
Finland, the fall in output gap came from a 
downward adjustment of domestic demand 
coupled with a drop in net exports. 
Looking ahead, business cycle differences could 
widen again in the medium-term as indebted 
countries could suffer from a prolonged period of 
sluggish growth. Adjustment to excessive private 
sector debt could indeed turn into protracted 
processes in these countries, involving both long 
periods of weak domestic demand and important 
restructuring on the supply side. Besides 
contributing to domestic growth, structural 
reforms aimed at increasing price and wage 
flexibility as well as at supporting resource 
reallocation would contribute to maintain business 
cycles more aligned. 
                                                        
(30) European Economy 1 (2010), 'Surveillance of Intra-Euro-
Area, Competitiveness and Imbalances'  
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II.3. Assessing the sources of non-price 
competitiveness  
Diverse export performances within the euro 
area 
Over the recent years, export performance has 
been far from homogeneous across euro-area 
Member States. As shown in Graph II.3.1, while 
some countries have experienced average annual 
growth of exports (intra and extra euro-area) of 
around 8% in the past 10 years (IE, SK), others 
have shown a poor export performance, with 
growth rates of around 2-3% (IT, BE, MT).  
The disparity in export performance can be 
explained by a number of factors, of which the 
strength of foreign demand and relative prices 
(price competitiveness) are generally seen as 
critical by many economists.  
Graph II.3.1: Real export growth, euro-area 
Member States (average annual growth           
in % – 1998-2009) (1) 
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(1) Export of goods and services. 
Source: Commission services. 
The available empirical evidence shows, however, 
that these two traditional factors can only go some 
way in explaining Member State differences in 
exports growth. 
Graph II.3.2 plots the average real export growth 
and external demand across euro-area countries. 
The relationship between the two variables is 
relatively weak. Since the mid-1990s, there have 
been significant country differences in the 
strength of foreign demand as measured by the 
potential size of each country's export markets but 
these differences alone can only account for a 
fraction of the heterogeneity of export 
performances. This means that there have been 
large differences in the countries' relative ability 
to exploit foreign demand. Particularly Ireland 
shows a comparatively high ability to exploit 
export demand, while Malta and Italy and to a 
lesser extent Belgium and France have not taken 
full advantage from raising export demand. 
Graph II.3.2: Export growth and foreign demand, 
euro-area Member States  
(average annual growth in % – 1998-2009) (1) 
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(1) The external demand variable measures the potential growth 
in size of a country’s export markets. The indicator is calculated 
as real total imports of main partners (35 industrialised countries) 
weighted by country's exports to these countries. 
Source: Commission services. 
Graph II.3.3 relates the growth of real exports to 
the growth of price competitiveness (as measured 
by the REER) over 1998-2008. The correlation is 
also weak and has the wrong sign. However, 
external demand and price competitiveness taken 
together account for a significant part of export 
growth. In fact, in a simple panel regression 
external demand and the REER explain around 
55% of the variance of exports in euro-area 
countries. With almost half of variance 
unexplained, this also shows that 'residual' factors 
other than the exchange rate and external demand 
need to be taken into account.  
Graph II.3.3: Export growth and price 
competitiveness, euro-area Member States  
(average annual growth in % – 1998-2009) (1) 
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(1) Price competitiveness is measured by the CPI-based REER. 
Source: Commission services. 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2010 
 
- 30 -
Country residuals from such a panel regression 
indicate whether exports developments can be 
attributed to factors others than foreign demand 
and price competitiveness. Countries for which 
the error component presents a systematic path 
over time might be experiencing an improvement 
or a deterioration of omitted variables such as 
non-price competitiveness factors driving export 
performance (for countries where there is a trend 
in the residuals see Graph II.3.4).  
Graph II.3.4: Residuals from basic regression 
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(1) Residuals of a regression in first differences with real exports 
as a function of price competitiveness and foreign demand. 
Source: Commission services. 
A first set comprises countries which enjoy a 
systematic upward path of the residuals. For these 
countries, the effect on exports of 
omitted/unobservable variables seems to be an 
improvement of exports performance over time 
with respect to what could be achieved only from 
demand and prices' behaviour. Slovenia and to a 
lesser extent Germany belong to this group. In the 
second set are countries like Portugal and Ireland, 
which show a negative systematic path of the 
omitted variables. This could for example 
correspond to a decrease of the quality of 
exported goods. Finally, the third group contains 
the countries for which the residual dynamic is 
either almost stable or too volatile (not displayed 
in the graph). Note however that these residuals 
are net of the effect of constant over time, country 
specific effects. 
Non-price competitiveness matters  
The evidence above suggests that price 
competitiveness is only one of the factors 
determining export performance and that more 
insights are needed into what lies behind the so-
called non-price competitiveness component. 
There is not a unique definition of non-price 
 
competitiveness. Non-price competitiveness 
factors include a broad range of elements such as 
product quality, technological advantage, industry 
specialisation, business environment, etc. Using 
only price competitiveness indicators in empirical 
analyses to explain export performance assumes 
that underlying factors driving non-price 
competitiveness are irrelevant or can be 
appropriately captured in country differences in 
the REER or foreign demand elasticities. For the 
euro area, even though the focus on price 
competitiveness may be justified as price and 
foreign demand explain to a considerable extent 
aggregate export developments, this is not the 
complete picture, particularly when trying to 
understand Member State differences in export 
performance. 
In order to reduce the complexity of such an 
exercise, this section focuses on a limited number 
of non-price competitiveness factors, namely 
technological aspects as proxied by R&D 
expenditures and business environment proxied 
by enforcement contracts conditions. 
Technological competitiveness and business 
environment factors are often mentioned in the 
literature although there are few studies with a 
euro-area dimension.(31)  
Technological aspects of competitiveness could 
affect export behaviour in different ways. Highly 
innovative countries can be expected to export 
more. Innovation is crucial in the development of 
new varieties of goods and services as well as in 
producing products of higher quality than those 
available in the market. R&D intensity could be 
considered as a proxy for technological 
competitiveness. Graph II.3.5 shows average 
changes in R&D intensity across euro-area 
countries for the period 1994-2009. Obviously, 
such a measure does not capture all possible 
innovation efforts. Producers may for instance 
accumulate a knowledge-base which is useful for 
production without engaging in formal innovation 
activities. This could eventually lead to the 
development of high-quality and knowledge-
intensive products.(32) 
 
                                                        
(31) See ECB (2005): 'Competitiveness and the export 
performance of the euro area', ECB Occasional Paper Series 
No. 30.  
(32) The relationship between innovation and quality depends 
very much on the sector. For some sectors quality upgrading 
requires innovation (industries with vertical differentiation), 
while this may not be the case for other sectors (e.g raw 
materials). 
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Box II.3.1: Real exports and their determinants
The table below summarises the results of a panel analysis of the determinants of real exports in euro area countries. 
The exports equation estimated is:  
ln(exportsit) = αi + γ ln(exportsit-1 ) + β ln(demandit) + δ ln(REERit) + γ ln(RDit) + εit 
for t = 1,…T, where exportsit is the volume of exports from country i at time t, demand measures world demand, 
REER is the real effective exchange rate, and the vector RD is R&D intensity. Country-specific fixed effects (αi) 
capture unobserved influences that remain constant over time. All other influences are contained in the error term 
εit.  
The basic model includes a persistence element (the lagged dependent variable), the external demand and the real 
effective exchange rate. Both external demand and the real effective exchange rate show a statistically significant 
relationship with real exports (Column 1). The extended model in Column 2 tests the role of R&D intensity in 
determining export performance. Given the time span between investing in R&D and innovation output, R&D 
expenditures are lagged in the equation (by 3 years). The results show that innovative countries export more and the 
long-run effect of R&D on exports is important: a 10% increase in R&D intensity increases exports of goods by 
1.7%. Given that the average increase in R&D intensity in the last decade is above 29% (all 16 countries are 
considered here) a 10% increase in R&D intensity seems fairly modest. Nevertheless there are large differences 
across countries and 5 of the euro-zone countries show growth rates under 10% (BE) or even negative (FR, LU, NL, 
SK). Other studies finding a positive effect of innovation on trade is Ioannidis and Schreyer (1997), Anderton 
(1999), European Competitiveness Report (2008). 
Exports and technology in the euro area 
Dynamic panel regression. Dependent variable is log of real exports (1) 
 Basic 
regression 
(Estimations 
run on total 
exports 
R&D 
Enforcing contracts 
(Estimations run on 
total exports 
  
Total exports 
Exports of 
goods 
 
Lagged exports  0.21** 0.23** 0.21** 0.10 
REER -0.28** -0.35** -0.38** -0.01 
Demand 0.76** 0.71** 0.71** 0.77** 
Lagged R&D  0.13** 0.15**  
Interaction effect R&D (2)  -0.01   
Enforcing contracts 
(procedures) 
   -0.30* 
Enforcing contracts (cost)    -0.83** 
(1) Sample covers 12 euro-area countries (it excludes LU, CY, MT, SK) for the period 1995-2009. All variables are 
in logs. The fixed effects model is estimated using the Arellano-Bond estimator.  
(2) The interaction effect is R&D intensity times the share of services in total exports. The variable tests whether 
services are less sensitive to technological developments.  
** Means significant at 5%, * is significant at 10%.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
Since R&D investment is concentrated in high and medium-tech manufactures, it is expected that exports of services 
have a lower elasticity with respect to innovation than exports of goods. This lower sensitivity of services to R&D is 
captured by adding a variable interacting R&D with the share of services in total exports. The interaction effect is 
not significant, but its negative sign shows that technology/innovation tends to be more important for exports of 
goods than for exports of services. This interpretation is confirmed by a slightly larger coefficient for the R&D 
variable in the regression with only exports of goods. Other studies have found a positive long-run effect of R&D on 
exports of services (see for example Pain and van Welsum, 2004).  
Estimating the impact of business conditions proxied by enforcing contacts indicators significantly reduces the 
sample (the indicator is only available for the period 2004-2009). The estimation results show that a high cost and a 
high number of procedures associated with encforcing contracts damages exports activities, although these results  
 
(Continued on the next page)
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Graph II.3.5: Changes in R&D intensity  
(in pp of GDP –1994-2009) 
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(1) For MT data covers 2002-2007; for CY 1998-2007; for LU 
2000-2007. 
Source: Commission services. 
The link between export performance and 
innovation intensity is confirmed in the regression 
analysis presented in Box II.3.1, which attempts 
to quantify the role of a range of determinants of 
exports besides foreign demand and relative 
prices. The analysis confirms that innovative 
countries export more and that the long-run effect 
of R&D on exports is important: a 1% increase in 
R&D intensity increases exports by nearly 0.2% 
cent. 
These results however have to be interpreted with 
caution as the link between technological 
competitiveness and exports is expected to vary 
across sectors. In particular, technological 
innovation is expected to be a more important 
determinant of high and medium-tech 
manufacturing sector’s exports. This calls for a 
deeper sectoral, disaggregate analysis on the role 
of innovation in explaining exports. 
 
Table II.3.1: Enforcing contracts across the      
euro area (2004-2009) (1) 
Enforcing contracts 
(procedures)
Enforcing contracts 
(cost)
IE 0.7 1.5
SK 1.0 1.5
SI 1.0 1.1
FI 1.0 0.6
DE 1.0 0.8
LU 0.8 0.5
ES 1.3 1.0
AT 0.8 0.7
EL 1.3 0.8
NL 0.8 1.4
PT 1.1 0.8
FR 1.0 1.0
BE 0.9 0.9
IT 1.3 1.6
(1) Average (unweighted) number of procedures in euro-area: 
31; average cost as a percentage of claim: 17.7%. No data 
available for MT, CY. Countries are ordered by decreasing 
exports growth rate. 
Source: World Bank Doing Business indicators. 
 
In addition to the factors already mentioned, 
export performance also depends on the business 
environment influencing countries' economic 
activity. To test for this possibility we use 
indicators related to enforcing contracts which 
could serve as a proxy for general business 
conditions. Table II.3.1 provides information on 
the number of procedures and cost associated with 
Box (continued) 
 
are only indicative and should be interpreted with caution given the low degrees of freedom (Column 3). A 1% 
increase in the number of procedures decreases exports by 0.3% and a 1% increase in costs decreases exports by 
0.8%. The average euro-area number of procedures in 2009 was 31 thus a 1% reduction does not seem to be a big 
effort. However, the data for the 16 euro-area countries reveal that only 6 countries (AT, BE, ES, IE, PT, SK) have 
seen the number of procedures decreased during the period considered. As for the cost, the euro-area average in 
2009 was 17.7% (of claim costs) but only two countries (FI, SI) have seen a decrease in the cost of enforcing 
contracts during 2004-2009. 
References:  
Anderton, R. (1999), 'Innovation, product quality, variety, and trade performance: an empirical analysis of Germany 
and the UK,' Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.51. 
European Commission (2008), 'European Competitiveness Report', 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/competitiveness/doc/compet_rep_2008/cr-2008-final.pdf.  
Ioannidis, E. and P. Schreyer (1997), 'Technology and non-technology determinants of export share growth' OECD 
Economic Studies, No. 32. 
Pain, N. and D. van Welsum (2004), ‘International production relocation and exports of services’, OECD Economic 
Studies, No. 38, Vol. 2004/1.  
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enforcing a contract per country, compared with 
the euro-area average.  
A number of countries perform relatively badly 
concerning the number of procedures (IT, ES, EL 
and PT), all of them also with below average 
export growth rate. The cost-related indicator 
shows a wider dispersion and a weaker correlation 
with exports growth. When controlling for price 
competitiveness and external demand (see 
Box II.3.1), the number of procedures and cost of 
enforcing contracts both have a strong negative 
effect on exports (particularly damaging is the 
cost-related variable).  
A 1% increase in the number of procedures 
decreases exports in the long-run by almost 0.3%. 
The long-run impact of a 1% increase in the cost 
of contracts is a decrease in exports by 0.8%. This 
suggests that administrative burdens have a 
negative influence on exports and that there might 
be gains from a further streamlining of regulation 
concerning enforcing contracts. These results 
should, however, be interpreted with caution due 
to the small size of the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Price competitiveness and external demand are 
the conventional variables used to explain export 
growth. Indeed, the evidence is that these 
variables explain a major part of export growth in 
euro-area countries. However, there is still a large 
part that cannot be attributed to conventional 
factors, which is usually attributed to broad 
category of determinants called non-price 
competitiveness. This section analysed the role of 
two specific non-price competitiveness factors for 
export performance: innovation and business 
environment. The former one is proxied by R&D 
intensity and the latter by enforcement of contract 
conditions. Econometric analysis confirms the 
importance of these factors on exports: R&D 
intensity is associated with increasing exports 
while costs and procedures related to contract 
enforcement have significantly negative impact on 
exports. These results suggest that by creating 
favourable conditions for entrepreneurship and 
innovation in domestic economies policy-makers 
can help euro-area companies to take advantage of 
the ongoing rapid recovery in world trade. 
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